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FROM MANDATES TO GOVERNANCE:
RESTRUCTURING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Brett H. McDonnell*
Matthew T. Bodie**
Abstract: Employers are saddled with a dizzying array of responsibilities to their employees.
Meant to advance a wide array of workplace policies, these demands have saddled employment
with the burden of numerous social ends. However, that system has increasingly come under
strain, as companies seek to shed employment relationships and workers lose important
protections when terminated. In this Article, we propose that employers and employees should
be given greater flexibility with a move from mandates to governance. Many of the employment
protections required from employers stem from employees’ lack of organizational power. The
imbalance is best addressed by providing workers with governance rights within the firm. In
exchange for these governance rights, governments can lift or relax many employment mandates.
In addition, certain responsibilities currently assigned to employers will be lifted and placed on
the larger society—where they would be more appropriately carried. This rebalancing of the
employment relationship will lead to a more economically secure and empowered populace
while at the same time freeing businesses to better pursue their entrepreneurial endeavors.
Introduction
Once upon a time, labor advocates envisioned collective bargaining as a movement to
advance industrial democracy. Workers would choose their collective representatives, and those
unions would negotiate to protect worker interests and shape the terms and conditions of
employment. In the latter half of the 20th Century that vision faded as unionization in the U.S.
cratered.1 There was an explosion of regulation that has dramatically changed the employment
relationship: minimum wage, overtime, antidiscrimination provisions, and health and safety
protections, to name a few. That regulation has replaced unionization as the prime legal strategy
for protecting workers, but it can impose levels of complexity and rigidity that undermine its
goals and result in uneven or lax enforcement.2 Even academics and regulators who advocate for
greater worker protections recognize the costs of expanding these mandates.3
Many employers chafe at these rules, and there have been increasing attempts to evade
employment regulation. Notoriously, Uber and Lyft have treated their drivers as independent
contractors rather than employees. In California, with a long reputation for an employee-friendly
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approach, the Supreme Court and legislature adopted a broad definition of “employee” that
included ride sharing drivers and other “gig economy” workers. But Proposition 22, passed in
November 2020, created a carve-out for platform drivers and provides a significantly limited set
of company responsibilities. Companies have designs on bringing this categorization of platform
workers to states across the nation.4
During the post-war decades, corporate governance also evolved. It became widelyaccepted that corporations exist to maximize shareholder value.5 Protecting employees and other
stakeholders was fine, but only if doing so would increase profits. If that leads to too little
protection, then pass laws focused on worker protection. Corporate governance protects
shareholders; employment regulation protects employees.
But more recently, corporations are under increasing pressure to shift from that narrow
focus on shareholders. Last year’s announcement by the Business Roundtable supporting a
stakeholder-oriented approach was just one notable example of a shift in business leaders
towards acknowledging environmental concerns, antiracism efforts, and employee
empowerment.6 But the Business Roundtable proposes no mechanisms for holding companies
accountable for protecting stakeholders, including employees, and the status of the average
American worker remains frustratingly stagnant. The novel coronavirus pandemic has
highlighted the disparity between workers, who face dangerous conditions and unemployment,
and shareholders, who enjoyed the highest Dow Jones Industrial Average on record.7
The success of Prop 22 was buoyed in part by the idea that platform workers should have
more flexibility and control over their work, less encumbered by the strictures of traditional
employment. At the same time, business leaders and investors are recognizing the need to move
beyond shareholder primacy in governing corporations. These two trends support a new
approach to work, one that provides workers with more power and employers with fewer
regulatory requirements. We suggest an exchange of governance power for employment
mandates.

4

Alex N. Press, With Prop 22’s Passage in California, Tech Companies Are Just Writing Their Own
Laws Now, JACOBIN (Nov. 2020), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/11/proposition-22-california-uberlyft-gig-employee; Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Takes a Victory Lap on Prop 22 and Talks about Taking It
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It is not new to suggest that self-governance is a better workplace model than mandatory
terms. The original Wagner Act was built on the premise of industrial democracy, and various
efforts at employee participation through quality circles, works council, and employee ownership
have made appearances within our economic fabric.9 Several scholars this century have
proposed regulatory flexibility for companies with employee representation, reflecting limited
developments in regulatory practice.10 But we are piling more and more of our societal
expectations onto employment just as its fissuring threatens the entire enterprise. Workers join
together to express their concerns about workplace safety, discrimination, and fair pay, while
their employers are governed by expectations of profit maximization and labor-cost reduction.
The chasm between employee power and corporate power is perhaps at its zenith, even while
public sentiment turns in favor of greater worker empowerment.
8

This article argues for reshaping the law of employment to emphasize employee
empowerment within the firm and deemphasize legal mandates. It builds upon recent work by
scholars advocating regulatory flexibility11 by focusing more on the corporate governance
implications and on the types of employee representation that could be used to invoke greater
flexibility, and by considering a wider range of employment regulation that could be made
flexible, including the link between a move to governance and parallel moves to provide some
collective goods through government rather than through employers. In Part I we survey
employment law. We describe the wide range and scope of legal mandates that employers face,
and the difficulties that those mandates create for both employers and employees. We analyze
how allowing firms that implement collective employee governance to modify some legal
mandates may reduce the costs of those mandates while still protecting employees.
Part II considers the corporate governance arguments for empowering employees. While
employment law focuses on protecting employees, corporate governance affects the interests of
many corporate stakeholders, such as shareholders, customers, creditors, local communities, and
the environment. Employees participating in governance will affect the interests of all those
stakeholders. The traditional American position is that those running corporations should focus
exclusively on the interests of shareholders. We argue that position is wrong.
Part III analyzes different forms of employee empowerment that employers could use to
modify employment mandates. We consider three basic forms: union representation, shop floor
governance such as works councils, and employee representation on the board of directors. Each
form presents a way to significantly involve employee representatives in governance, allowing
firms to achieve better tradeoffs in protecting employees at a reasonable cost to other
8

CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION
23 (2010) (“This is not the first proposal to improve compliance with employment mandates by fostering
new vehicles for employee representation.”).
9
See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor
Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 496 (1993) (discussing the role of democratic governance as an organizing
principle for the Wagner Act).
10
ESTLUND, supra note 8; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 407-23 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein,
Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205 (2001).
11
See id. and accompanying text.
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stakeholders than is achieved by our complex system of employment law mandates. Each form
has its advantages and disadvantages. Any one of them, if instituted with adequate protections,
should allow employers to modify some employment regulatory mandates.
What mandates should employers be able to modify? Part IV provides a brief outline,
touching on but not resolving many issues. A variety of employment law rules, including
minimum wage, workplace safety, pension protections, health insurance mandates, and possibly
even antidiscrimination rules could be modified. Mostly we do not suggest completely
eliminating a particular mandate, but rather allowing employers with employee involvement to
modify the mandate within limits, or changing the process by which the mandate is enforced. We
draw a connection between modifying mandates through governance and changing the locus of
responsibility for some matters from employers to government. For example, were the state to
institute a substantial universal basic income, then it would be more feasible to allow empowered
employees to agree to wages well below the minimum wage level.
Part IV also considers how moving from mandates to governance would affect, and be
affected by, the growth of platform companies and other forms of employment disintermediation
and the related debate over defining who is an “employee.” The greater flexibility of governance
may help protect workers such as drivers at Uber or Lyft while allowing their employer to avoid
the most burdensome regulatory consequences of treating such workers as employees. But, such
disintermediated workplaces raise serious doubts as to whether our arguments favoring worker
empowerment apply as well in such businesses. We are left with open questions, but still the
hope that moving from mandates to governance may improve regulatory options for an important
and growing segment of the economy.

I.

The Role of Employers as Aggregators of Responsibilities

In corporate governance, the term “employer” is not legally meaningful. The
responsibilities of various parties within the corporate form do not change based on whether the
corporation is considered an employer. But in a variety of other areas—labor and employment
law, certainly, but also tax, intellectual property, and tort—the law ascribes certain obligations
on employers that are different than other entities. As a result, the role of employer has become
a legally meaningful one, and entities have taken great pains to try to avoid being labeled as
such.12 In this Part we first examine the legal responsibilities placed on employers and discuss
the differences between the mandatory and default approaches to these rules. We consider why
employment is such a meaningful category for these responsibilities and then discuss the
competing considerations that come from the regulation of labor through mandates in both
positive and negative ways.
A.

Legal Obligations Imposed on Employers

12

For an in-depth discussion of efforts to avoid the employment relationship, see DAVID WEIL, THE
FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
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A complex network of laws—state and federal; statutory, regulatory, and common-law—
create the set of responsibilities imposed on employers and employees as part of the employment
relationship. Below is a brief overview of the obligations that employers assume when they
create an employment relationship.
1. Collective representation
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)13 is the closest that labor and employment
regulation comes to addressing the management and governance of the employer. Under the
NLRA, the employer (whatever its organizational form) must bargain with its employees’ chosen
representative over the employees’ terms and conditions of employment.14 A complex array of
subsidiary obligations flow from this central one, such as the prohibition against employer
discipline or discharge because of an employee’s protected concerted activity.15 The employer
need not agree to any specific set of terms, but it must bargain in good faith and abide by the
complex system of federal labor law for managing this bargaining relationship. Unlike other
duties imposed upon employers within the employment relationship, the duty to bargain does not
require minimum employment terms or impose substantive obligations on the employer’s
business. Instead, the NLRA requires employers to negotiate with employees as a group and
prohibits individual contracts.16 Framers of the NLRA intended to introduce a form of
“industrial democracy” and provide employees with a voice at the workplace.17
2. Compensation and Benefits
Employee compensation is regulated both as to the amount and the process. As to the
amount, federal law requires employers to provide a minimum.18 and pay certain categories of
employees one-and-a-half times their hourly wages if they work over forty hours per week.19

13

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
Id. §158(a)(5) (holding it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees”).
15
See id. § 158(a)(1), (3).
16
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (“The very purpose of providing by statute for the
collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which
reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group.”).
17
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: HEARINGS ON S. 1958 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 642 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1617, at 2028 (1949) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner
that “[t]hat is just the very purpose of this legislation, to provide industrial democracy”).
18
See 29 U.S.C. § 206. There are limited exceptions to this requirement for workers under 20 years of age
who are new to the job, id. § 206(g). Restaurant servers get a significantly reduced minimum wage as
long as customer-paid gratuities make up the difference. See id. § 203(m).
19
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. The big exceptions for overtime pay fall into so-called “white collar”
categories—professional, executive, and administrative workers. Id. § 213(a)(1) (exempting those
“employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity”). Other exemptions include
certain types of farm workers, id. § 213(a)(6), employees of seasonal amusement or educational centers,
id. § 213(a)(3), and computer programmers, id. § 213(a)(17).
14
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State and local minimum wage laws often go well above the federal minimums.20 In terms of the
manner of compensation, wage payment regulations require that employees be paid regularly and
that they be paid for all time worked, regardless of the length of term.21 Along with employer
wage payment duties under the common law,22 federal and state statutes require timely wage
payments and divisible portions.23
With respect to pension benefits,24 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)25
does not require that employers provide pension or welfare benefits, but it does provide
mandatory standards when they are provided26 The Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA to
borrow principles from the law of trusts with respect to fiduciary obligations.27 Specifically, the
administrator of an ERISA plan has the same responsibilities as a trustee when it comes to
administering the plan.28 The statutory scheme provides for four primary fiduciary duties: the
duty of loyalty to plan participants,29 the duty of prudence,30 the duty of prudent diversification
of plan assets,31 and the duty to follow plan terms.32 In addition, there are specific requirements
about the operation of the plan, such as vesting.33 The upside of this complicated regulatory
scheme is a set of tax savings for both employer and employee. However, this tax savings is

20

See Irene Lurie, Enforcement of State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: Resources, Procedures, and
Outcomes, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 411, 436 (2011) (providing a table of state minimum wage and
overtime laws as of 2010).
21
See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 3.01 cmt. b (2015) (“Many states have wage-payment
laws that determine the mode and frequency of payment.”).
22
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 3.01-3.05 (2015); see, e.g., id. § 3.01(b) (“Whether
compensation has been earned is determined by the agreement on compensation between the employer
and employee or any relevant binding promise or binding policy statement on compensation made by the
employer.”).
23
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (requiring the payment of minimum wages and overtime based on
specific periods of work); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-502 (requiring employees to be paid at least
every two weeks or wice in a month); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 148 (requiring the payment of
wages within a week of the worker’s pay period).
24
Health and safety benefits are discussed below in Part I.A.4.
25
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
26
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 516 (2010) (“Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that employees
would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress did not require employers to establish benefit
plans in the first place.”).
27
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA's legislative history confirms
that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions codify and make applicable to ERISA fiduciaries certain
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
28
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008) (stating that courts “should analogize a
plan administrator to the trustee of a common-law trust” and “should consider a benefit determination to
be a fiduciary act”).
29
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (also known as the exclusive benefit rule).
30
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
31
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
32
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
33
See, e.g., id. § 1053 (providing for minimum vesting standards for employee retirement accounts).
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only available if the employer offers the benefits to a sufficiently broad number of employees—a
doctrine known as “nondiscrimination.”34
3. Limitations on discipline and termination
The “employment at will” rule, which is the default rule in all states except Montana,
dictates that employment is terminable at any time, with or without cause.35 As a default rule, at
will employment can be changed contractually.36 The common law of tort provides for
additional protections against wrongful discharges in violation of public policy.37 The employer
has a duty not to fire an employee because the employee refused to violate the law in the course
of employment,38 or because the employee abided by professional codes of ethics or conduct.39
The protections also extend to employees who report on employer wrongdoing, either up the
chain within the employer or directly to outsiders such a government agencies or media
members.40 Employer discretion is also bounded by numerous antidiscrimination statutory
schemes that apply to employer termination or discipline. Federal law protects employees from
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, religion, age, and disability.41
State and local laws provide additional protections for these categories.42
When employees are discharged otherwise lawfully, state law provides for
unemployment compensation for a set period of time.43 Although states manage their own
systems, as a general rule they require employers to pay into an unemployment insurance fund
34

See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1)(A) (requiring that the plan benefit at least seventy percent of employees
who are not highly compensated employees). ERISA’s so-called “nondiscrimination” requirements
endeavor to achieve the “social policy goal of ensuring that the employer’s rank and file employees
benefit from the employer’s qualified plan.” COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 164 (4th ed. 2015).
35
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (2015).
36
See, e.g., id. § 2.02 (providing for contractual exceptions to at-will); § 2.03 (explaining cause
requirements for contractual agreements for employment as to a definite term); § 2.05 (explaining the role
of employer policy statements within the employment agreement); § 2.07 (discussing the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing within the employment relationship).
37
Id. § 5.01.
38
Id. § 5.02(a).
39
Id. § 5.02(e).
40
Id. § 5.02(e) cmt. f.
41
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (making it an unlawful practice to “discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (providing similar
protections against age discrimination within the employment relationship); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(providing similar protections against disability discrimination); Bostock v. Clayton Co., 590 U.S. ___
(2020) (finding that Title VII covers discrimination based on sexual orientation).
42
1 MICHAEL B. SNYDER, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS § 8:4 (2016) (“Nearly every state has a fair
employment practice (FEP) law, and most states also have their own administrative agencies to
investigate charges of discrimination and enforce these FEP laws. Almost 200 local jurisdictions also
have FEP laws and companion enforcement agencies.”).
43
See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 1051 (7th ed. 2011) (“Fifty states,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have individual unemployment insurance (UI) programs
determining the length of unemployment insurance benefits and their amounts for qualifying recipients.”).
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and require compensation when the employee is terminated unless the employee has quit or has
engaged in significant malfeasance.44 During the pandemic, the federal government provided an
addition $600 a week in unemployment up through the end of July and also provided assistance
to independent contractors through a federal fund.45
4. Health and Safety
Under the common law, employers have a duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace
and warnings for dangerous working conditions.46 The federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA)47 imposes on employers a general duty to provide safe working conditions.48 In
addition to this general duty, OSHA enforces a complex regulatory framework as established
through promulgated occupational safety and health standards.49 When one employee harms
another as a result of tortious behavior, the employer is liable if that tort was committed within
the employee’s scope of employment or if the employer later ratifies the conduct.50 Employers
also have a common law duty to exercise care in selecting, retaining, and supervising its
employees,51 and they are liable for harm to employees caused by their failure to exercise
reasonable care in these responsibilities.52
Under workers’ compensation laws, employers are responsible for workplace injuries that
require medical treatment and may result in employee disability.53 The workers’ compensation
model represents a bargain between employer and employees, struck by state legislatures:
employees are covered for all workplace injuries without having to prove employer fault, and

44

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Benefits,
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2020/complete.pdf.
45
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES), Pub. L. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
46
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 (2015). The duty has been recognized in all U.S.
jurisdictions. See id. at Reporters’ Notes for cmt. a.
47
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
48
See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (requiring employers to “furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards”).
49
Id. § 654(a)(2).
50
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03(a) & (b) (2015).
51
Id. § 4.04.
52
See, e.g., Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ohio 1991) (“[A]n employer may be liable
for failing to take appropriate action where that employer knows or has reason to know that one of its
employees poses an unreasonable risk of harm to other employees.”); Retherford v. A.T. & T.
Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 973 (Utah 1992) (describing the elements of a
claim of negligent employment).
53
Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 50, 53-59 (1967) (tracing the evolution of workers' compensation insurance in the
United States).
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employers are only liable for statutory damages based on medical care and degree of disability.54
States often require employers to carry workers compensation insurance.55
When workers are dealing with medical emergencies, federal law requires unpaid leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).56 Employees are given up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave a year for family or medical leave and are allowed to return to their job or an
equivalent position.57 Eight states and the District of Columbia have paid family or medical
leave statutes;58 thirteen states and D.C. have paid sick leave requirements.59 Federal plans for
paid sick leave have been proposed by both parties and may soon see enactment.60
Until recently, health insurance plans were regulated primarily by state law, with ERISA
providing only framework protections.61 However, the Affordable Care Act created a new set of
incentives and requirements for employers with respect to such insurance. The employer
mandate requires employers of a certain size to purchase health insurance for their employees or
provide funding for employees to buy their insurance on state exchanges.62 If employers fail to
do so, they must pay a tax penalty. Despite fears that the ACA would drive employers out of the
54

Shauhin Talesh, Insurance Law as Public Interest Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 985, 1001 (2012) (“[T]he
workers' compensation system emerged from a desire to create a new, workable, and predictable mode of
handling accident liability that balanced the interests of labor and management.”).
55
Anthony J. Barkume & John W. Ruser, Deregulating Property-Casualty Insurance Pricing: The Case
of Workers' Compensation, 44 J.L. & ECON. 37, 43 (2001) (noting that “states generally require workers'
compensation insurance coverage”).
56
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
57
Id. § 2612(a)(1).
58
National Conference of State Legislatures, Paid Family Leave Resources,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/paid-family-leave-resources.aspx (noting the
passage of paid family leave laws in California (2002), New Jersey in (2009), Rhode Island (2014), New
York (2016), Washington state (2017), Washington D.C. (2017), Massachusetts (2018), Connecticut
(2019) and Oregon (2019)).
59
National Conference of State Legislatures, Paid Sick Leave, https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/paid-sick-leave.aspx (noting the passage or voter approval of sick-leave laws in Connecticut
(2011), California (2014), Massachusetts (2014), Oregon (2015), Vermont (2016), Arizona (2016),
Washington (2016) Rhode Island (2017), Maryland, (2018), New Jersey (2018), Michigan (2018),
Nevada (2019) and Maine (2019)).
60
See Healthy Families Act, H.R. 1286, 113th Cong., March 20, 2013,
http://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1286 (requiring employers to permit each
employee to earn at least 1 hour of paid sick time for every 30 hours worked); Presidential Memorandum,
Modernizing Federal Leave Policies for Childbirth, Adoption and Foster Care to Recruit and Retain
Talent and Improve Productivity, Jan. 15, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/01/15/presidential-memorandum-modernizing-federal-leave-policies-childbirth-ad; Miranda
Bryant, Congress Is 'Better Poised than Ever' to Pass Paid Family Leave Bill, Lawmakers Say,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/06/paid-family-medical-leavebill-congress.
61
Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of Mandated
Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1363-74.
62
The employer mandate is developed in 26 U.S.C. § 4980H. For a brief overview of the employer
mandate, see Suja A. Thomas & Peter Molk, Employer Costs and Conflicts Under the Affordable Care
Act, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 56, 58-59 (2013).
9
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health insurance market,63 there has only been incremental movement away from providing
insurance despite rising premiums.64
5. Tax responsibilities
Firms are also given responsibility for their employees when it comes to taxes.
Employers must withhold their employees’ taxes65 and must pay a share of Social Security and
Medicare (FICA)66 and unemployment (FUTA) taxes.67 The IRS defines employees based on
the common law control test.68 Employer withholding is extremely important to the public fisc;
payroll taxes alone make up 34 percent of all federal revenues.69 And the consequences of an
employer misclassification can be extremely costly, as the business is then subject to the
mandatory back-tax formula.70
B. Employment as Locus of Regulation
The legal obligations that employers must shoulder hinge on the concept of employment.
Only employees are entitled to this specific set of legal obligations. The concept of employee
dates back to the idea of “servant” in master and servant law. Under the common law of agency,
masters are responsible for the torts of their servants if those torts were committed within the
scope of employment.71 It is in this sense that “responsibility” was first imposed on employers.

63

See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping
Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 127 (2011) (“[C]ommentators have generally focused on the
prospect that employers will choose to drop health coverage entirely when ACA's core reforms are
implemented in 2014.”).
64
See Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits: 2020 Survey, Oct. 8, 2020,
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2020-Annual-Survey.pdf (showing that
the percentage of firms offering health benefits has only dropped from 59% in 2009 to 56% in 2020). For
a discussion of how the ACA has changed American norms about government’s role in healthcare, see
Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 495, 496
(2020).
65
26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(c), 3402.
66
Id. §§ 3101, 3121(d).
67
Id. §§ 3301, 3306(i).
68
Id. § 3121(d)(2) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any individual who, under the
usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of
an employee”); 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (finding an employment relationship “when the person for
whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services,
not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that
result is accomplished”); see 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) (stating that “the term ‘employee’ has the meaning
assigned to such term by section 3121(d)”); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298–99 (laying out a
twenty factor test to aid in “determining whether an individual is an employee under the common law
rules”).
69
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes, April 2, 2014,
http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes.
70
26 U.S.C. § 3509(a). In fact, Congress was moved to create a safe harbor. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2885.
71
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
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It was not until the Third Restatement of Agency that the official change from master and servant
to employer and employee was recognized.72
The federal legislation of the New Deal infused the concept of employment with specific
regulatory responsibilities. In defining who fit the definition, this legislation took two approaches.
Many statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act, did not provide a definition of the term
“employee.”73 The NLRA did not originally exclude independent contractors, and both the
National Labor Relations Board and the Supreme Court originally held that so-called
“newsboys” were statutory employees for purposes of the Act, even though they were considered
independent contractors.74 However, Congress rejected this interpretation of the Act and added
independent contractors specifically to the list of excluded categories.75 The Board then adopted
the common-law right to control test in excluding independent contractors. The Supreme Court
sanctioned this test in NLRB v. United Insurance Co.,76 making clear that the Board had a range
of discretion in implementing the test. Over time, the common law test for employment has
become the statutory definition if that statute itself leaves the term undefined.77
Using a different approach, the Federal Labor Standards Act defines “employ” to include
“suffer or permit to work.”78 Because employ is defined differently and more broadly, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the FLSA may extend to cover workers beyond the reach of
the common law agency test.79 This approach, knows as the “economic realities” or “economic
dependence” test, is generally interpreted to provide a more expansive definition to the term
“employee.” The term “employee” was “to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by
underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal
classifications.”80 That reference to “economic facts” became “economic reality” in later cases
72

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006) (defining an employee as “an agent whose
principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's performance of work”).
73
Excluded employees include: agricultural workers, domestically-employed healthcare or family care
employees, public-sector employees, railroad, airline, and other transportation workers covered by the
Railway Labor Act (RLA), independent contractors, and supervisors. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
74
N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The Court explicitly rejected the common
law distinction between employees and independent contractors, holding that the news vendors in
question were “subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate.”
Id. at 127.
75
29 U.S.C. § 152(3). See Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§141-197 (2006)) (amending the NLRA to exclude
independent contractors).
76
390 U.S. 254 (1968). Noting that “[t]here are innumerable situations which arise in the common law
where it is difficult to say whether a particular individual is an employee or an independent contractor," the
Court required courts to uphold reasonable determinations “even though a court would justifiably have
made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Id. at 258, 260.
77
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (interpreting the scope of the
work-for-hire doctrine); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (interpreting the
definition of “employee” under ERISA).
78
29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
79
See Darden, 503 U.S. at 326 (noting that the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some
parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”).
80
N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).
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defining the category of “employee” in the context of the Social Security Act81 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).82 According to the “economic realities” test, “employees are those who as
a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render service.”83 In
recognition of the FLSA’s broader coverage, courts have either implicitly or explicitly looked to
the “reality” of the workers’ dependence on the putative employer.84 The focus on economic
reality is meant to cut through formalistic trappings to get at the heart of the relationship.85
Despite these dueling definitional approaches, the concept of employment has been fairly
stable over time. It remains the most important economic relationship for most adults, with
almost two-thirds working as employees.86 Because of its centrality, it has been used as a nexus
of economic regulation covering a range of public policies. These obligations have incentivized a
fair amount of regulatory arbitrage to try to avoid the employment relationship.87 The muchheralded gig or platform economy is at the forefront of this shift, with millions of workers
shifting to more flexible and online work arrangements.88 Proposition 22 in California has
completely upended the efforts of the California Supreme Court and the state legislature to
categorize these workers as employees. With momentum at their back, platform companies are
now reviewing their options in pushing for a non-employee agenda across the country.89 The
stable consensus on the meaning of employment and its consequences may be on the verge of
complete destabilization.
C. Difficulties for employers and workers
81

United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (“We concluded that, since that end was the elimination
of labor disputes and industrial strife, ‘employees' included workers who were such as a matter of economic
reality.” (discussing N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944)).
82
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-Op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (holding that “the ‘economic reality’
rather than ‘technical concepts' is to be the test of employment”).
83
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (interpreting tax provisions), quoted in Mednick v.
Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975) (interpreting the FLSA).
84
Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing
economic dependence as “the focus of all the other considerations”); Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 346 (“As a matter
of economic reality, the Sales Leaders were dependent upon Cornerstone to such an extent that they could
not plausibly be considered ‘in business for [themselves].’”).
85
Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299-302 (5th Cir.1975) (characterizing the ultimate
inquiries as: “Is [the worker] the kind of person meant to be protected by the F.L.S.A.? Is he dependent
upon finding employment in the business of others . . ., (one of) those who themselves are least able in good
times to make provisions for their needs when old age and unemployment may cut off their earnings?”
(quotations omitted)).
86
Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release: Work Experience of the Population—2019, Dec. 19, 2020,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/work.pdf (finding that 168 million people worked during 2019).
87
In fact, many of these companies are engaging in “regulatory entrepreneurship”—pursuing a line of
business in which changing the law is a significant part of the business plan. Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan
M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017).
88
Uri Berliner, Jobs In The Pandemic: More Are Freelance And May Stay That Way Forever, NPR.ORG
(Sept. 16, 2020 7:50 a.m.), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/16/912744566/jobs-in-the-pandemic-more-arefreelance-and-may-stay-that-way-forever; COVID-19 Is Accelerating the Rise of the Digital Economy,
BDO.COM, May 2020, https://www.bdo.com/insights/business-financial-advisory/strategy,-technologytransformation/covid-19-is-accelerating-the-rise-of-the-digital-e.
89
See Press, supra note 4; Hawkins, supra note 4.
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Even if workplace regulations are justified from a perspective of equity and fairness, they
still exact a cost. The standard complaint from employers concerns the breadth and depth of
regulations concerning the employment relationship. Although not often the subject of legal
scholarship, the complexity of workplace laws is well-recognized.90 This is not to say that U.S.
employment regulation is unusually burdensome internationally; most nations provide more
significant restrictions on employer discretion particularly with regard to termination.91 But the
United States has been accreting additional layers of obligations upon the employment
relationship fairly continuously since the New Deal, and there are many complex features to
workplace law.
Just to provide one example, the Family and Medical Leave Act requires unpaid leave for
up to twelve weeks a year for family or medical reasons while permitting the employee to return
to an equivalent position after the leave.92 This requirement sounds straightforward and supports
an important societal policy of care for oneself and one’s family. But the translation of statute
into action can be quite uncertain. First, along with the birth or adoption of a child, employees
are provided with leave if they have a “serious health condition that makes the employee unable
to perform the functions of the position,” or if they need to care for a close relative with a serious
health condition.93 The statute defines a serious health condition as “an illness, injury,
impairment, or physical or mental condition” that involves either hospitalization or “continuing
treatment by a health care provider.”94 The regulations differentiate between treatment that
includes a course of prescription drugs, which would be covered, and a course of over-thecounter drugs, which would not be covered.95 The regulations further define a serious health
condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider to require “a period of
incapacity of more than three consecutive, full calendar days,” along with subsequent treatment
“two or more times, within 30 days of the first day of incapacity” or “on at least one occasion,
which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care
provider.”96 Often it will not be clear at the onset of the illness whether it meets the

90

STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES: BRINGING
WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY INTO FOCUS 130 (2009) (calling the U.S. system “a complex
maze of common law doctrines and individual statutes on varied employment and labor law topics from
racial discrimination to whistleblowing, from childbirth leave to Social Security benefits, from workplace
safety to collective bargaining, from explicit minimum wage standards to tax subsidies for private health
insurance”); Hirsch, supra note 3, at 89 (“The laws and regulations governing the American workplace
reveal a level of complexity and uncertainty that rivals virtually any other area of law.”).
91
Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American
Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 445-46 (2014) (noting that countries within their survey “typically
have either general just-cause provisions or enumerated lists of lawful or unlawful reasons for
dismissal”); Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment
Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73 (2007).
92
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
93
Id.
94
Id. § 2611(11).
95
29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c).
96
Id. § 825.115(a). The provision further requires that the “requirement in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of
this section for treatment by a health care provider means an in-person visit to a health care provider. The
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requirements of a serious health condition.97 The employer must also determine if employees are
eligible for FMLA leave. The employee must have worked at least 1,250 hours during the
previous 12-month period,98 must not be a key employee,99 and must be one of at least 50
employees within a 75-mile radius of the particular worksite.100 Other complications include the
timing and categorization of employee leave, the use of paid leave, and the interaction between
the FMLA and the ADA.101 Not surprisingly, human resource professionals find FMLA leave to
be very challenging to properly track, label, and provide notice to employees.102
Our network of regulations become manifold more complex when we consider state
regulations. These regulations make things significantly more complicated for firms with
geographic distribution of employees. As Jeffrey Hirsch has argued:
Most employers are at least regional, if not national and international, in scope.
Even many small businesses either compete or have a presence in numerous
jurisdictions. States' current authority over much of the workplace fails to
acknowledge this reality, and this failure comes at a cost. At best, multiple layers
of regulations create complexities and redundancies that increase compliance
costs and make enforcement more difficult. At worst, inconsistencies or outright
conflict make compliance and enforcement nearly impossible.103
Taking one of these sets of laws, Hirsch has argued that termination protections are “numerous,
complex, and unnecessarily confusing,” with over twenty-five different federal statute and rules
from every state and numerous localities.104
The complexity of modern workplace regulation hampers the enforcement of these
requirements. Workers must know and understand the law’s provisions in order to understand
their rights. If the laws are too complex, workers will not grasp when they are entitled to
first (or only) in-person treatment visit must take place within seven days of the first day of incapacity.”
Id. § 825.115(c).
97
Compare Caldwell v. Holland of Texas, Inc., 208 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a child’s sudden
onset of an ear infection may have been a serious health condition) with Weidema v. State Dep't of
Transp., No. A11-1397, 2012 WL 2873942, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 16, 2012) (finding a biopsy for a
potentially cancerous cyst was not a serious health condition when the cyst was revealed to be benign).
98
29 U.S.C. § 2611(2).
99
Id. § 2614(b). A key employee is defined as “a salaried eligible employee who is among the highest
paid 10 percent of the employees employed by the employer within 75 miles of the facility at which the
employee is employed.” Id. § 2614(b)(2). Key employees can be denied reinstatement to their previous
position if “such denial is necessary to prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to the operations
of the employer.” Id. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
100
Id. § 2611(2).
101
See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 282-83 (2008).
102
Stephen Miller, HR Professionals Struggle over FMLA Compliance, SHRM Tells the DOL,
SHRM.ORG, Sept. 21, 2020, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/hrprofessionals-struggle-over-fmla-compliance-shrm-tells-the-dol.aspx (discussing “many of the challenges
and frustrations that confront HR professionals as they comply with the [FMLA]”).
103
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 225, 228 (2008).
104
Hirsch, supra note 3, at 95 (describing these laws as “the result of incrementalism run amok”).
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protection and when they are not. They may fail to consult with attorneys—a necessary step,
since many provisions are enforced through private rights of action.105 Complexity even foils
attorneys. A study of briefs by plaintiffs’ attorneys in employment cases found that many
attorneys failed to raise important claims or rebuttals to defenses in their briefs.106 Judges were
not immune either, making mistakes on basic principles of doctrine.107 At some point an
overload causes systems to crash, rendering them unable to provide the workplace fairness that
the law would seem to enact.
The rise of human resources management as a field is symptomatic of the growth of
complexity in employment regulation. HR is now its own recognized field of learning.108 The
human resources field started with the premise that poor management practices were ultimately
at fault for the rift between management and labor.109 As the field has developed, it has focused
more on increasing firm value.110 Although the field is not focused solely on legal compliance,
the focus on these matters is undeniably their responsibility, at least at an initial level.111 The
Society for Human Resource Management (“SHRM”) boasts a global membership of over
300,000, and it regularly weighs in with Supreme Court amicus briefs and regulatory comments
on labor and employment issues.112 With its own set of classes, certifications, and information
network, SHRM serves as the hub for a large set of professionals devoted at least in significant
part to making sure that employers follow the law.
The purpose of these regulations and the firm infrastructure that enforces compliance
with it is to protect employees and provide them with a higher level of benefits from
employment. But the either-or aspect of employment protections may in fact harm workers as
well. In rare instances, an individual worker may rationally prefer independent contractor
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Id. at 99.
Scott A. Moss, Bad Briefs, Bad Law, Bad Markets: Documenting the Poor Quality of Plaintiffs' Briefs,
Its Impact on the Law, and the Market Failure It Reflects, 63 EMORY L.J. 59, 63 (2013) (finding that “the
vast majority of plaintiffs' briefs omit available caselaw rebutting key defense arguments and lose at more
than double the rate of competent briefs”).
107
Id.at 66-67 (“[S]ome judges just get it wrong, eagerly granting summary judgment in defiance of Rule
56 standards that are too established to blame the lawyers.”).
108
As a recent president of the Society of Human Resource Management (SHRM) said, “Perhaps the
greatest human resources accomplishment . . . has been the worldwide recognition that human resources
management is, indeed, a profession with a clearly defined body of knowledge.” Michael R. Losey,
Mastering the Competencies of HR Management, 38 HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 99, 99-100 (1999).
109
BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ORIGINS & EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 25 (1993).
110
Sanford M. Jacoby, A Century of Human Resources Management, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TO
HUMAN RESOURCES AND BEYOND: THE EVOLVING PROCESS OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS MANAGEMENT
147, 165 (Bruce E. Kaufman, Richard A. Beaumont & Roy B. Helfgott eds., 2003).
111
Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 159, 161 (2013).
112
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., ABOUT SHRM, https://www.shrm.org/about-shrm/pages/default.aspx
(last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
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status.113 But the package of benefits that accrue with employment status means that almost
every worker would be better off as an employee rather than an independent contractor. As a
result, the line between employment and alternative statuses becomes increasingly high stakes.
Getting employment status means getting all the benefits that society imparts upon employees.
Others are left out. We have seen this division in other employment circumstances. For
example, in the post-bankruptcy General Motors negotiations, the United Auto Workers
consented to a split between then-current workers and future employees in which the later
workers received significantly less in pay and benefits.114 In academia, because tenured
professors enjoy such significant employment protections, there is growing pressure to hire
nontenured faculty to teach a larger and larger percentage of courses.115 Under these
circumstances, the workplace can become divided into haves and have-nots, where one set of
workers have significantly more privileged circumstances than others. The
employee/independent contractor divide is one of these chasms.
Since these divides within the workforce often favor incumbent workers, more senior
workers, and more traditional workers, they can disproportionately burden younger, less senior,
and more diverse workforce participants. Julie Suk has argued that job security protections can
exacerbate racial inequality in employment, leading to tensions such as the 2005 riots and
student protests against proposed labor law changes in France.116 The larger the burden of hiring
new workers, the less likely employers will be to hire new workers. This stasis can slow the rate
of social change and frustrate a workforce that would otherwise receive a higher number of
opportunities.
This description of the cons of employment regulation has painted with a broad brush.
The intent is to frame some of the common costs and concerns raised by our admittedly
byzantine system. But there are strong arguments for employment regulations as well.
D. Arguments for regulations
We have seen that the legal rules imposed on employers are extensive and onerous. For
the most part the rules are mandatory, not default rules that can be changed by individual
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ESTREICHER & LESTER, supra note 101, at 14-15 (discussing that some workers might prefer to sue in
tort for an injury rather than being limited to workers compensation, or may prefer to avoid the fiduciary
obligations against competition through employment).
114
Phoebe Wall Howard, UAW: 'Pay hasn't caught up with inflation' after 'bankruptcy sacrifices',
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/2019/09/27/gm-strikemary-barra-pay-uaw-wages/3776066002/ (discussing the differences in pay between workers hired before
and after 2007).
115
Colleen Flaherty, A Non-Tenure-Track Profession?, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Oct. 12, 2018,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/12/about-three-quarters-all-faculty-positions-are-tenuretrack-according-new-aaup (finding that about three-quarters of all faculty positions are off the tenure
track).
116
Suk, supra note 91, at 76 (“The historical and current sociological data support the conclusion that the
Labor Code's employee job security protections have contributed significantly to employers' propensity to
engage in both rational and irrational discrimination against racial minorities in hiring.”)..
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employers.117 They create significant costs, most obviously for employers, but sometimes for
employees as well. What sorts of arguments justify these rules? And do those arguments justify
making the rules mandatory? The arguments obviously vary for different rules, but there are a
core set of types of arguments that are widely invoked in justifying these extensive mandatory
employment rules.
At the broadest and most philosophical level, many are concerned with promoting the
autonomy of employees. Many see the employment relationship as one of dominance of
employees by their employers.118 Such domination is inherently objectionable under a liberal
worldview that emphasizes the ability of all to act autonomously in choosing how to live their
lives. Domination may also lead to outcomes that disadvantage employees, because they have
little bargaining power in setting the employment contract. The arguments that follow can be
understood as providing more detailed understanding of elements of this general concern with
autonomy and domination.
One important source of inequality in the employment relationship is that in many ways
employees are likely to have more limited information than employers,119 particularly when one
compares the information available to individual employees with those available to an employer
that is a relatively large and sophisticated organization. Most employees are not likely to have
access to information about the firm’s financial condition. They are also less likely to understand
relevant laws and circumstances in relevant markets in which the employer operates. Large
organizations with significant resources exist in good part to collect, pool, and deploy
information.120 As we shall see, one important part of our proposal for employee involvement in
governance is to give employees access either to these same organizational resources for
information or to the competing resources of a union.121
A variety of cognitive biases may affect the ability of employees to bargain effectively.
They may be short-sighted, either in that they do not understand or give too little weight to the
long-term effect of arrangements they agree to.122 They may be overly optimistic that a variety of
risks will not happen to them.123 They may be overly trusting when entering into an employment
relationship.124
Collective action problems may also block employees from effectively bargaining
individually to protect themselves within the employment relationship. These may involve
117

Guy Davidov, Nonwaivability in Labour Law, OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2021); Sunstein,
supra note 10, at 210-11 (“The third approach involves nonwaivable employees’ rights. . . . This approach
dominates the current system of statutory protections for workers in America. . .”).
118
Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need
of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357 (2002).
119
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 229-31.
120
Lit on this
121
See infra notes 241 and accompanying text.
122
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 242 (recent evidence suggests workers are myopic or short-sighted).
123
Id. at 242 (“people tend to be risk optimists”).
124
Denise Skinner, Graham Dietz, & Antoinette Weibel, The Dark Side of Trust: When Trust Becomes a
‘Poisoned Chalice,” 21 ORGANIZATION 206 (2014).
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collective action among employees working within the same firm, or among employees across
firms or seeking employment. Within a firm, many elements of the workplace are local public
goods.125 The safety of a building or assembly line, for instance, is largely the same for all
workers involved. Many of the elements of some collective benefits are also local public goods.
For instance, in providing health benefits an employer will negotiate an arrangement with one
insurer or health provider—offering many different insurers or providers for each employee to
choose among would involve much higher administrative costs. Like all public goods, there will
be a tendency to under-provision, as each employee acts as a free rider and hopes others will
lobby the employer to provide more (or better) of the good.
For employees not in the same firm, collective action problems could create a race to the
bottom. That is, given the relative bargaining position of employers and employees, if the former
make low ball offers, the latter will feel forced to accept them—even if all employees feel they
are unfair, if some employees do accept, others will be left out in the cold. Signaling and adverse
selection may worsen this problem. For instance, on the subject of at-will employment,
employees who insist on for-cause employment may risk signaling they expect that employers
will want to fire them, while employers that offer protection against firing may attract employees
likely to need that protection.126
A final type of reason for strong, mandatory employment law protections is third-party
effects. Perhaps the most important third parties are taxpayers and the government. For instance,
if employers offer poor health care or retirement benefits, society may be caught having to
provide for struggling employees.127 Later, once we have introduced the possibility of employee
involvement in firm governance, we will see significant potential third party effects on others,
such as customers and the environment.128
E. Mandatory vs. default rules and altering rules
We have now briefly surveyed both leading benefits of and justifications for employment
regulation129 as well as leading costs created by that regulation.130 Most legal obligations
imposed on employers are mandatory. That is, if one meets the statutory definition of an
employer with the requisite number of employees, and does not fall within an exception, one
must follow the rule. There is no procedure by which a particular employer can modify the rule.
That contrasts strongly with the area of corporate, and more generally business association, law,
where most rules are defaults that can be modified by a particular company. There are some
exceptions to the generally mandatory nature of employment regulation. Under the Voluntary
Protection Program, employers with an approved safety program are subject to a looser
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Davidov, supra note 117, at [15-16].
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 225 (“An employer who is willing to offer job security might find that it is
attracting marginal workers. At the same time, an employee who presses hard for job security might be
signaling that he will deserve to be discharged.”).
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Davidov, supra note 117, at 17.
128
See infra Part II.D.
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enforcement system by OSHA.131 Some states have similar programs in workplace safety
enforcement.132 Various internal company procedures, such as training and codes of conduct,
help protect against liability under antidiscrimination laws.133 But these are exceptions to the
general rule of mandatory employment law.
A variety of arguments, particularly commonplace for those versed in law and
economics, suggest advantages from rules that are default rather than mandatory. Most broadly,
the same fundamental value of autonomy that is used to justify workplace regulation can also be
invoked to question mandatory legal rules. If individual employers and employees both choose
not to be bound by a particular rule, shouldn’t we accept their choice? The other arguments
canvassed next suggest various reasons why employees might have good reason to choose not to
have some rules applied to them.
Regulators, be they legislators or executive agencies, may make poor choices in imposing
employment regulations. They may under-estimate the costs generated by a regulation, or overestimate the value that employees place on the protections offered by it. When a regulation is
default, such regulatory error will be less costly as employees and employers opt out of illconsidered rules.
Differences among employees create another problem for mandatory rules. Rules
typically come as one size fits all, but they may not fit all employees equally well. Limits on
hours and overtime requirements may be valued more by middle-aged parents with children than
by childless workers in their twenties. Healthy young employees may be willing to gamble with
a barebones health insurance policy more than older employees with significant health risks.
College professors may care less about having early retirement benefits than manual workers.
And so on. With default rules, there is more room to mold the set of applicable rules to the needs
of particular workers, or at least workforces.
The wide range of rules applicable to the employment relationship134 deepens these
problems with mandatory rules. Even if each individual rule is sensible for most employees, the
full package of rules may not be. In part that is due to the multiplicative complexity of
compliance.135 In part it is because employees, and whole workforces, may differ in the weight
they place on the value of different rules. As the costs of complexity rise, it may make sense to
loosen or waive some rules, but which rules are best weakened may vary among employees and
employers. Regulators are even more likely to make mistakes in evaluating the interactive impact
of multiple rules than they are in evaluating the impact of individual rules on their own.
So far, we have assumed a dichotomy between mandatory and default rules. Part I.D
gives some arguments in favor of mandatory rules, while this Part I.E identifies some drawbacks
131

Lobel, supra note 10, at 418 (“allowing companies with exemplary safety records to take over the role
of OSHA inspectors themselves and to be exempt from regular inspections”).
132
Id. (describing California Cooperative Compliance Program).
I
Id. at 421 (“governance strategies may operate as a defense against liability or against the grant of
punitive damages in case of discrimination allegations by employees”).
134
See supra Part I.A.; Hirsch, supra note 3.
135
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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of such rules. But we often face a less stark choice than simply mandatory or default rules. For
one thing, a rule can give employees or employers a degree of choice, while setting a mandatory
floor (or ceiling).136 Of more interest for our purposes here, in setting default rules, regulators
can also specify what process is required in order for an individual or organization to opt out of
the default rule. These rules for what it takes to opt out of a default rule have been called
“altering rules.”137
Attention to altering rules adds new options for addressing the tradeoffs between
mandatory versus default rules. One can set a default rule that strongly protects employees.
Then, employers could be allowed to opt out of that rule, but the altering rule can be devised in a
way to protect employees against abuses while still allowing them to opt out where there seems
to be good reason to do so, and where concerns about potential abuses are reduced by the process
required for opting out.138 Corporate law, for instance, contains a variety of default rules
protected by somewhat “sticky” altering rules that protect shareholders. These include
requirements for shareholder approval of certain major transactions, supermajority provisions,
and sunset provisions.139
For this paper, the type of altering rule that interests us concerns employee involvement
in corporate governance. This could take the form of employee election of corporate directors,
union representation, or works councils along the German model.140 Allowing companies that
follow such an altering rule to opt out of some employment regulations would alleviate some of
the problems with mandatory rules identified in this Part I.E.141 If the employee governance
mechanism is properly structured with necessary safeguards, then when employees collectively
have decided to modify some legal rules, we would be relatively confident that the governance
process has addressed the informational, cognitive, incentive, and collective action problems
identified above142 that are used to justify making rules mandatory. Of course, the devil is in the
details—what structural safeguards are needed to give assurance that decisions to opt out
genuinely reflect the considered best interests of the affected employees? We shall have to
address that question below.
II.

Employers as Firms

In Part I we explored the many legal responsibilities that are tied to the employment
relationship. These all attempt to protect employees. We argued that there should be considerable
leeway to vary the rules in firms with adequately empowered employees, an argument we shall
elaborate in later Parts. But advocating for employee involvement implicates the interests of
136
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shareholders and other stakeholders. Would it be good for them? Does involving employees in
firm governance constitute good corporate governance, not simply good protection of
employees? Yes. Employees and shareholders are the key inside participants in firm production,
and involving them in governance will increase value created for all firm stakeholders. In
defending this claim, we first critically review the leading arguments usually made to defend the
prevailing American focus on the interests of shareholders in governing corporations.143 We then
show how core concepts from the economic theory of the firm support involving employees in
governance, situating them as core insiders along with shareholders.144 Finally, we suggest
reasons why employees will tend to support decisions that favor the interests of other
stakeholders, such as customers, local communities, and the environment, as well.145
A. Shareholder Primacy
The leading economic theories of the firm are far from intrinsically hostile to governance
arrangements that empower employees.146 However, as the economic theory of the firm was
incorporated into legal scholarship, it was closely associated with perspectives that focused on
promoting shareholder wealth maximization and empowering only shareholders (at most) above
all other stakeholder groups. These perspectives both reflect basic structural realities of
governance in corporate law and also helped shape understanding of that law.
The core structural fact of corporate law is that the board of directors controls most
decisions, and only shareholders elect directors. Also, only shareholders vote alongside the board
on certain fundamental transactions.147 Scholars seeking to justify corporate law must explain
this special role for shareholders. As theory progressed with that explanation at the same time as
the growth of shareholders engaged in hostile takeovers, the focus on shareholders helped shape
an understanding that the fiduciary duty of directors requires an exclusive ultimate focus on the
interest of shareholders.148
The leading scholarly argument favoring an exclusive focus on shareholder wealth
maximization as the objective of corporate decisonmaking has been that shareholders are the
residual claimants. Common shareholders are not promised any set financial return. Rather, they
have the ultimate right to profits earned after all other claimants with fixed contractual rights
have been paid.149 Residual claimants have a special role because it harder to write a contract
143
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protecting their interests. All decisions affecting a corporation affect the return of the residual
claimants, and no explicit contract can instruct managers how to make all decisions.150
Moreover, choices that maximize firm profits will maximize total social surplus, assuming that
all social costs and benefits are adequately priced in the goods and serviced consumed and sold
by firms.151
There are a variety of problems with these arguments for the shareholder wealth
maximization norm. Employees are often significant residual claimants too, as the income and
future prospects of employees depend upon their employer’s profitability.152 Shareholders do not
have incentive to maximize the financial surplus a firm generates, because limited liability makes
them prefer overly-risky actions.153 Shareholders will not generally agree on maximizing
shareholder value as the sole valuable goal.154 Finally, the assumption that input and output
prices internalize all relevant social costs and benefits is heroic.155
Another leading argument for shareholder wealth maximization is that shareholders have
more homogenous interests than other stakeholders, and hence will conflict less in making
decisions.156 However, more recent scholarship has emphasized that shareholders are quite
varied, with differences in time horizon, risk preferences, voting rights, and non-financial
preferences.157 Even where shareholders agree on wealth maximization as a goal, they may
disagree on how to achieve that goal.158 Thus, conflict is a serious problem among shareholders
as well as other stakeholders, including employees.
Many scholars who believe that maximizing shareholder wealth is the proper end of
corporate law advocate relatively strong shareholder power to ensure managerial
550 (2003). Much of this theory is rooted in a nexus of contracts approach drawn from Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Jensen and Meckling focus on how the financial structure of a
firm, in particular the choice between debt and equity, affects agency costs. Note that this theory focuses
on providers of money, i.e. shareholders, and has little to say about the employment relationship for nonmanagers.
150
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accountability.159 However, some who accept that end nonetheless believe that shareholders
should have quite limited power, leaving boards and managers wide discretion to decide how
best to maximize shareholder wealth. Steve Bainbridge’s board primacy theory argues this
position (which aligns well with Delaware corporate law),160 drawing strongly on the tradeoff
between authority and responsibility emphasized by Ken Arrow’s theory of corporate
governance.161 However, Bainbridge does not explain why that tradeoff should always be
decided in favor of authority.162
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout offer a different defense of board primacy, one that serves
as a transition to alternative approaches to corporate governance.163 Drawing on Ragan and
Zingales’s theory of access to resources,164 they conceive of the board as a mediating hierarch
which regulates resource access for competing groups of corporate insiders, with none of them
given much power so that the hierarch can deal fairly with all.165 They thus do not see the
interests of shareholders as being privileged, and in other work Blair argues for a role for
employees in corporate governance.166 However, in their joint work Blair and Stout accept the
existing corporate law framework in which only shareholders are empowered to elect the board,
even though that framework does not seem to follow from their theory.167
.
B. Employees and Firm Governance
We reject the above arguments for privileging shareholders. Our approach would
transform both the allocation of power and the understanding of the appropriate objective
function for businesses. In allocating power, we suggest a role for employees, either in choosing
the board of directors (or comparable leading decisionmaker), choosing representatives to a body
that makes major employment-related decisions, or choosing a union to bargain for employee
interests.168 In understanding the objective function of businesses, we would conceive of it as
balancing the interests of shareholders and employees.169 Employees are at the heart of the core
productive activities that define a firm. That makes employees vulnerable to opportunisitic
decisions that hurt them, gives them access to crucial information that can benefit the business,
and makes motivating effective employee behavior critical to firm success.
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One argument for empowering employees flows from the economic theory of the firm.170
If a party to a relationship invests heavily in property that is much more valuable within the
relationship, that person may then find it hard to exit the relationship, and may thus lose
bargaining power. Relationships should be structured to limit this hold-up problem.171 Giving a
vulnerable party power over decisions is a one such way of structuring relationships.
Shareholders of a corporation are one vulnerable group, insofar as they finance the purchase and
development of firm-specific physical and reputational capital. Indeed, this is another standard
argument in favor of shareholder primacy.172
But many employees invest heavily in firm-specific human capital, economist jargon for
knowledge and skill that is valuable only while working within a given business. Think, for
instance, of knowledge about who within an organization can best help solve problems of
different types, or knowledge of vocabulary and operating procedures unique to a business. This
specialized knowledge makes employees residual claimants as well. As her firm-specific human
capital grows, an employee becomes increasingly tied to the firm, since she is more valuable
working there than anywhere else. Although she may receive wages set at a specific amount by
contract, her job security with associated future advancement, wage increases, and pensions
depends on the prosperity of her employer.173 Moreover, the stake of employees in a firm is
inherently undiversified—most persons have only one job at a time. Shareholders in public
companies, at least, can easily diversify their investments.174 Thus, the standard economic theory
of the firm suggests that employees are due at least as much protection and control as
shareholders.
Empowering workers can also improve the functioning of firms in several crucial ways
tied to information that employees learn through their work. First, employees learn much about a
business’s affairs as a byproduct of their work.175 This information can generate useful ideas for
how to produce more efficiently, ways to improve customer satisfaction, and potential new
investment opportunities. Knowledge-based theories of the firm point to this as an important
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factor in productivity, and the growing importance of knowledge in many firms176 may argue for
a better integration of employees within firm governance.
Employee information is also useful for holding managers accountable—employees will
often know when those in charge are misbehaving. Particularly in public companies, employees
are likely to be far better informed than shareholders. Thus, employee governance may improve
the authority/responsibility tradeoff that Arrow emphasizes, assuming one treats this as a genuine
tradeoff rather than as an argument for always favoring authority a la Bainbridge.177 Note that
both of these uses of information improve firm functioning generally, making a larger surplus
available to distribute for employees, shareholders, and other participants.
There is a surface tension between this informational argument favoring employee
governance and the informational argument favoring mandatory employment regulation, namely
that employees need protection due to an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis employers.178 The
two points do not conflict. There are various types of information that are relevant to employee
welfare and firm governance. Employees have natural access to some types of information,
particularly concerning working conditions, and some aspects of relations with customers as
well. Most employees lack access to other important sorts of information, including the
company’s financial position and complicated legal regulations.
Involving employees in governance decisions may also improve their job satisfaction and
motivation.179 Research on procedural justice suggests that if people believe decisions are made
in a fair way, they will be more likely to abide by the decisions and to promote the goals of the
business.180 This will reduce the bonding and monitoring costs required to get employees to do
their jobs well.181 This is another way that employee governance may increase the total firm
surplus available to distribute among all stakeholders, including shareholders.
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Despite these arguments for empowering employees, there are significant concerns. The
argument about the relative homogeneity of shareholders reducing politicization182 leads to a
mirror-image critique of employee governance as increasing decision costs.183 The problem is
worse if one combines both shareholders and employees in governance, as the two groups may
conflict frequently. This has been a common criticism of codetermination in Germany.184 This is
a real concern, but it is often over-blown. We have already seen that shareholders are quite
heterogeneous themselves,185 reducing their advantage over employees. Furthermore, there are a
variety of ways to reduce the costs of employee governance. Employees and managers could
learn how to manage the decision process more effectively. They could learn in many ways: in
school186 (including business school), through experience in more participatory organizations, or
with the help of supporting persons and organizations such as lawyers, consultants, and banks.
This suggests significant network effects and path dependence: the more widespread employee
governance is, the more likely it would be to find such institutional support, and vice versa.187
C. Employees and Other Stakeholders
Company decisions affect other stakeholders too. These include creditors, customers,
suppliers, local communities, and the environment. Increasing attention is being paid to
stakeholder interests.188
Much corporate law activism and scholarship criticizing the shareholder primacy
approach has focused on the interests of multiple stakeholder groups.189 We agree with the move
away from shareholder wealth maximization, but we also think that in general employees and
shareholders have a more central place within the firm than other stakeholders.190 The above
arguments for employee involvement in governance do not apply to other stakeholders in most
circumstances. Other stakeholders do not usually make significant firm-specific investments in
physical or human capital, and hence are more able to exit and do business with other firms.
Other stakeholders also typically do not acquire as much valuable information about firms in
182
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their relationships with them. Since other stakeholders are typically not acting on behalf of a firm
in their relationship, they do not need to be motivated to act loyally. In most circumstances,
persons other than managers, shareholders, and employees are not directly involved in joint
production activities. The other stakeholder groups are not insiders as employees are.191 There
are circumstances where a stakeholder group should be given a central voice in firm governance.
Consumer and supplier cooperatives have a long history.192 But they are exceptions, albeit
notable ones.
Though in most cases it does not make sense to give stakeholders other than employees
and shareholders formal voting power, it is good if those who do have power are inclined to take
the interests of others into account. The standard argument for shareholder primacy denies this.
So long as market prices for inputs and outputs reflect social costs and benefits, maximizing firm
profits will maximize net social value. Markets will do much to reflect social costs, particularly
when one considers reputational effects. Where prices and reputation fail to internalize all
important social effects, the standard argument is that other forms of legal regulation outside
corporate law should limit harmful behavior.193
However, while market, reputational, and regulatory protections go a long way in
reducing externalities, they all have serious shortcomings. Hence we want business managers to
take into account the interests of various stakeholders, above and beyond their impact on longterm profits. Another argument for involving employees in governance is that they are often
more likely than shareholders to have interests aligned with those of other stakeholders who we
want to protect. It is a common argument that the shareholder wealth maximization norm has
caused managers to focus on short-term profits in ways that harm many other interests.194 Might
employee representatives behave differently?
They might. Insofar as public bads generated by businesses have mainly local effects,
employees, who live where the business is located, may care more about those effects than more
dispersed shareholders.195 For shareholders with a significant financial stake in a business, that
large stake may cause them to focus more on profits than is the case for employees.196 There is
some evidence that smaller firms and firms located in communities with higher social capital
pollute less.197 Also, insofar as the traditional understanding of shareholding focuses on financial
returns, the focus on money may make it less likely that shareholders will follow other-regarding
191
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norms than employees. That is not to say that employee governance will always be a boon to
other stakeholders—sometimes it will not. But overall we suspect that employee involvement in
governance will be good for other stakeholders.
III. Systems of Employee Governance
Employee participation in firm governance is not a new idea. There are a variety of
possible ways through which workers may have voice and power within the overall governance
structure. In this part, we consider three main types of employee governance: union
representation, shop floor governance, and board representation. Union representation involves
employees selecting a labor organization to represent them in bargaining over wages and the
conditions of employment. There are many variations, including which employees in a firm are
unionized, how many different unions represent employees in the firm, and what they are
empowered to bargain about. Shop floor governance, such as works councils or the holacracy
model, involves employees either directly or through elected representatives in decisions
concerning local operations and decisions. Board representation involves having employees elect
representatives to the board of directors. This can vary in several dimensions, including what
fraction of directors employees select and whether all employees vote together or separate
categories vote separately. Together, these three systems offer potential mechanisms through
which employees can participate in governance. Below, we briefly survey these possibilities and
evaluate their use in constructing a more robust method of worker governance.
A. Union Representation
Our current labor unions have their genesis in both artisanal craft guilds and the social
movements of the early industrial era. Craft guilds date from the middle ages when groups of
learned tradesmen created associations to preserve their traditions and protect their business
interests.198 In the United States, journeymen workers formed craft unions beginning in the early
19th Century.199 These craft unions flourished as institutions for lower-level workers within the
skilled trades, with sixty-two such unions having been formed by the end of the 1800s.200
Concurrently with these trade-oriented organizations were the development of social movements
for the industrial workers who began filling factories during the Industrial Age. Here the unions
focused on plight of unskilled workers and relied on mass organizing, strikes, and protest. The
line between these approaches was not necessarily well-defined, but roughly the divide was
between skilled artisanal workers protecting their trade and industrial workers fighting for
survival wages and basic rights.201
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Labor relations were largely unregulated in these early days, although courts did at times
unions or pursue criminal judgments when workers worked together to push for better terms and
conditions.202 Although a consensus emerged over time allowing unions to organize and go out
on strike, courts still were quick to enjoin picketing and boycotts as restraints of trade under
common law.203 Labor law was federalized in 1935 through the Wagner Act, which provided for
a right to join unions, a mechanism for selecting union representation through voting, and the
regulation of employer unfair labor practices such as discrimination against union activity. This
model has been modified over time to regulate secondary picketing and require democratic
governance within labor organizations but has kept the basic structure of exclusive
representation, collective bargaining, and protection of employee rights. Even public-sector
unions, which are governed by state law, follow these basic building blocks.
The raison d’etre of private-sector labor law is collective bargaining. If selected by a
majority of employees in a bargaining unit, a union is empowered to bargain in good faith with
the employer on the workers’ behalf. The employer must bargain with the union or else it
commits an unfair labor practice.204 The rest of labor law facilitates this bargaining relationship:
employers are not permitted to fire or punish workers for their support of the union; the National
Labor Relations Board conducts elections to determine if employees want a union to represent
them; and unions cannot conduct signal picketing at secondary employers—employers with
whom they do not have a bargaining relationship.
Our system of collective bargaining has been justified as a form of “industrial
democracy” or “workplace democracy” because of its use of elections to empower workers.205
Undoubtedly, unions have negotiated better terms and conditions of employment for represented
employees: higher wages, just-cause termination protections, grievance-arbitration processes,
and stronger benefits.206 Unions can also work with employers to tailor collective bargaining
agreements toward the particular experiences of the workers involved. As a “democracy,”
workers vote for their collective representatives and also generally vote to approve the collective
bargaining agreements that they negotiate.207 Labor organizations can also consolidate power as
collective representatives and may call out the workers on strike to reinforce their negotiation
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Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984) (noting that unions need not offer
employees a vote on contract ratification).
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positions.208 This mix of democracy and power is why many reformers and academics still see
labor unions as the best mechanism for worker empowerment and just workplaces.
Unfortunately, only a small percentage of workers now have collective representation.
The percentage of unionized private-sector employees has been steadily shrinking since its 1950s
heyday, from a high of about 35% to the current 6.6%.209 Moreover, from a governance
perspective, there is a larger structural problem with labor law: it is not true governance power.
Employers need only bargain in good place—there is no requirement that the employer make any
concessions to union demands.210 Federal labor law also leaves much of the core operations of
the employer’s business off the table. Employers are only required to bargain on topics that are
categorized as “mandatory” subjects of bargaining.211 The mandatory label applies to the terms
and conditions of employment; the employer has no duty to negotiate over issues such as product
development, executive compensation, financial structuring, and even internal firm
governance.212 The “core of entrepreneurial control”213 is reserved to the employer itself as a
matter of governance that lies outside the bargaining process. By centering collective bargaining
only on the employment relationship, federal labor law has fenced workers and their
representatives out of any real participation in the firm’s management.214
At one point in our history, we expected collective bargaining to create a system of
industrial democracy in which employees would participate in the governance of their
workplaces. The project succeeded in substantial ways, but unions now only represent a small
fraction of private sector workers. And as a system of democratic governance, collective
bargaining is flawed: it maintains the internal firm governance of the employer and only requires
the employer to bargain over terms and conditions of employment. True worker governance
requires a different approach.
B. Shop-floor Participatory Governance
208
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The modern corporation is generally managed from within through a hierarchical
approach. The board of directors has control over the company but delegates governance
responsibilities to a set of officers, who then control the actual workings of the corporation.215
The chief executive officer has ultimate managerial power, with other officers below, and then
executives, managers, and the mass of employees. This structure informs our legal and societal
perspective on the nature of the organization itself. We assume that corporations must be
governed from within through hierarchy, and that the work of employees is controlled by the
employer, acting through managers and supervisors.
However, hierarchy is not endemic to the corporate structure. Participatory management
is a common term for those managerial methodologies that endeavor to flatten or shift the power
relations within the traditional corporate chain of command. Systems of participatory
management have a long if limited history, both in the United States and abroad. The last
significant bloom of participatory management within firms occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, as
U.S. firms looked to Japan and Germany for guidance.216 Ideas such as quality circles and total
quality management moved away from rote assembly lined to a system of worker responsibility
for the ultimate product.217
As concerns about the social purpose of corporations has grown, companies are
rediscovering participatory management models.218 These approaches do not fall within the
established alternatives such as employee-owned companies, consumer cooperatives, or nonprofits. Instead, they are for-profit companies, organized as corporations, partnerships, or LLCs,
that have radically restructured the internal hierarchy. These efforts have been accorded various
labels, such as “self-managed,” “self-actualizing,” “evolutionary,” “integral,” “flat,” and even
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216
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“teal.”219 They seek to bring more worker participation within the traditional outer shell of
business organizations.220
Systems of participatory management have been the subject of much discussion in the
business management literature but have been less examined in the legal literature.221 There is
less to talk about, as these systems generally sit within the standard corporate governance
framework and exist in union-free workplaces. As creatures of management policy, these
systems can be installed, changed, and removed without any employee consent or input.222 At
most, employees might have contractual claims to certain procedures, but courts have generally
looked less kindly on those as management lawyers know how to insert the right disclaimers.223
So participatory management exists outside the zone of relevance for the law – it is a managerial
strategy.
The law could be reoriented to incentivize or require companies to adopt certain aspects
of participatory management. Unions existed prior to federal labor law, but the NLRA created a
legal system of rights and responsibilities that facilitated their role within the economy. But the
current lack of legal intersection points up one of the weaknesses of participatory management: it
is a function of managerial decisionmaking, and it exists at the pleasure of management. As
currently utilized in the U.S. economy, they are designed to bolster quality and productivity
within the workforce by empowering workers within their jobs. It is the rare participatorymanagement system that seeks to empower workers by constraining management.224 But
binding systems of employee participation have generally come through unions or, as discussed
next, through corporate governance.
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WORLD (2015); Bernstein et al., supra note 219. For an exploration of the legal ramifications of
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The default rule for holacracy is to leave this structure in place. ROBERTSON, supra note 220, at 151
(suggesting that beginning holacracy adopters use a CEO policy, rather than board-level action, “to avoid
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RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 (2015) (noting that “the presence of a prominent
disclaimer in the text of the statement may indicate that it is a hortatory pronouncement rather than a
statement intended to govern the employer's operational personnel decisions”).
224
This is arguably what holacracy is designed to do. As Robertson describes it in his book, the firm’s
constitution under holacracy is the “core rulebook for the organization” whose “rules and processes reign
supreme, and trump even the person who adopted it.” ROBERTSON, supra note 220, at 21.
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C. Board Representation and Employee Ownership
The most direct method of employee participation in governance is through various
mechanisms of employee ownership. Employee-owned firms have taken on different forms:
worker cooperatives, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), equity compensation plans, and
managerial leveraged buyouts. By aligning workers’ incentives with the overall value of the
firm, employee ownership not only motivates workers to maximize utility—it also gives workers
the true benefits of their labor. The idea of employee ownership rights has resonated within the
American ethos throughout our history and unites those who favor a hardscrabble capitalism
with those who believe in a society of civic engagement.225
Despite efforts to facilitate employee ownership, it remains largely marginal within our
economic system. The ESOP, introduced with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974, has had sustained if limited success.226 An estimated ten percent of employees
participated in ESOPs as of 1990;227 in 2020, around 10 million workers are active
participants.228 However, while ESOPs facilitate employee participation in ownership, they do
not offer much employee participation in governance. Employees participate in the ESOP as
beneficiaries of a plan, and the plan’s trustee manages the shares on their behalf.229 The law
does not require that employees vote for directors or otherwise have rights beyond financial
interests.230 Thus, ESOPs are similar to other compensation mechanisms such as stock options
and bonus plans—they provide financial participation in the share price but do not require
employee governance representation.
Other organizational structures offer more direct participation, most notably the
cooperative. Structured differently than corporations, cooperatives generally provide for one
“share” for each participant and require participation in governance from all members.231
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Consumer cooperatives have been prevalent in some industries, such as utilities and insurance.232
Worker cooperatives, however, have not been common.233 A relative of the worker cooperative
is the partnership controlled by a set of workers. Law firms were mandated to take the form of
common partnerships owned by a set of attorneys who worked for them.234 Today, however,
most states permit law firms (and other associations of professionals) to form as limited liability
partnerships and have management structures closer to corporate ones. Corporate ownership of
law firms is still not permitted.
These models of worker governance are tied to ownership, in that workers have both
financial rights to profits or distributions as well as governance rights. But other models provide
for governance without financial stakes. The system of codetermination provides for employee
representatives on the board of directors simply through their role as employees. Employee
board representation has a very limited history in the United States, but it is governing law in
many European states, most notably Germany. Under German law, employees select fifty
percent of the directors on the supervisory board, which has similar responsibilities to the U.S.
corporate board.235 Although shareholders select the chair, who acts as the tiebreaker, employees
have significant power within the corporation and have operating control in many companies.236
In the last two years, bills proposed by Senators Baldwin and Warren have each proposed
systems of codetermination requiring U.S. companies to have a percentage of their workers on
corporate boards.237
D. Assessing Systems of Employee Governance Participation
We have seen two different kinds of arguments in favor of involving employees in firm
governance. First, it could lead to better protection of employees. Rather than relying on
mandatory employment regulations that could go wrong for a variety of reasons, setting default
rules that protect employees while allowing those employees through a collective process to
modify the rules can lead to better protection at a lower cost.238 Second, employee governance
may generate a higher surplus that benefits all participants in a business enterprise, not just
employees but also shareholders, creditors, customers, and the community at large. If
232
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employment regulation encourages employee involvement in governance, it can thus improve the
lot of all corporate constituencies.239
How do these three types of employee governance compare in their ability to address the
various major arguments that favor mandatory employment regulation?240 That is, what types of
employee governance will best respond to the problems that employment regulation attempts to
correct, so that we will feel comfortable allowing the relaxation of regulation where such
governance is present? One argument favoring regulation is that individual workers will have
trouble accessing and processing some important types of information more readily available to
employers, including the financial condition of the business and the regulatory environment.
Board representation is the type of employee governance most likely to reduce this disparity with
respect to company-specific financial (and other) information, as it gives employee directors
access to all of the information about the company available to the board, which is essentially all
the relevant internal information (although directors are less able than officers to fully digest this
information,241 so even board representation won’t fully equalize the disparity between workers
and officers). For information on the legal and market environment, both board and union
representation would seem to have some advantages. Employee directors again have access to
the same information available to the rest of the board, but unions may have alternative sources
of information on labor and employment laws, and on market conditions in other unionized
companies, that might be particularly useful from a worker perspective.
Another set of arguments favoring mandatory employment regulation concerns collective
action problems. As we saw, these can be internal within a company or external for workers
across different companies.242 For the internal collective actions, both board representation and
shop floor governance are potentially effective, with the latter particularly focused on many of
the key local public goods, such as workplace safety. For the external collective actions, union
representation would seem the better solution.
The final set of arguments we saw favoring mandatory employment regulation looked at
a variety of cognitive biases that may prevent individual workers from adequately bargaining to
protect their interests.243 Moving from individual to collective bargaining may address at least
some of these biases. In part that may happen through a collective deliberation process, although
collective processes can produce their own biases (e.g., elected representatives may have a time
horizon limited by the length of their term in office). It is not clear which if any of the three
forms of employee governance has an advantage on this dimension.
How do the three types of employee governance compare in their ability to achieve the
potential gains in generating surplus for all corporate constituencies, while avoiding potential
239
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costs that could reduce or eliminate those gains?244 Board representation would give employees
voice over the widest range of decisions affecting them, and bring their information and
perspective to bear on those decisions. But board representation also may be subject to more
conflict and decision costs and do more to scare off investors, at least as compared with shop
floor governance and perhaps as compared with unionization too. Much of the informational
benefit that comes from employee involvement will involve the kind of in-company, shop-floor
issues captured through shop floor governance. It is not clear which form of governance is likely
to have stronger motivational effects.
What about the effect of employee governance on decisions affecting stakeholders other
than employees and shareholders?245 For these effects, board representation seems the most
significant, as it gives employees a voice in all major decisions affecting a company. Both union
representation and shop floor governance are focused on terms and conditions of employment
that are likely to be of most interest to employees themselves and to shareholders through the
effect on profits, with other stakeholders less concerned with most of those decisions.
We thus see that each type of employee governance has some comparative advantages
relative to the others, and all of them have the potential to allow employees to modify
employment regulations to more effectively and cheaply protect themselves while also creating a
bigger surplus to be shared with shareholders and other company stakeholders. One could allow
use of only or two of these three types of governance as a way to allow employers to modify
regulatory mandates, or try to fine tune the system to require employers to use one form of
employee governance to modify some mandates but another form to modify other mandates.
However, no one system of employee governance is superior enough to suggest privileging it
over the others, so in our proposal we suggest allowing employers to use any one of the three
types of employee governance as a way to modify regulatory mandates.
IV. Moving from Mandates to Governance within the Employment Relationship
In this Part we set forth a plan for moving from a system largely built around mandatory
employment terms to a system that provides for employee participation in firm governance. We
first establish the principles for directing such a move, and then examine concrete changes to
employment regulation following from these principles. We then discuss the implications of the
move from mandates to governance for the increasingly prominent discussion of how to define
who is an employee.
A. Principles of a Governance Model for Employment
The regulation of employment is an incredibly complex endeavor, with many different
moving pieces.246 Below we provide a preliminary overview for a new approach with the
guidance of certain principles.
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First, we conceive of the “employer” as a business firm. Labor and employment law has
focused on the definition of employee and has largely neglected the concept of the employer.247
But the concept of an “employer” is critical to the idea of employment regulation: the employer
is the regulated entity. The law tends to focus on the status of a business entity under
organizational law: corporation, LLC, partnership, or other form. But employers can be any of
these; the critical aspect of being an employer is that employers enlist workers as part of ongoing
business enterprise in which the workers participate.248 The economic literature defines such
entities as firms and has devoted a subdiscipline of economics to why we have firms within
larger markets.249 Employers are firms and are defined by their use of workers to carry on the
ongoing enterprise of the firm.250
By recognizing that employers are economic organizational entities, we should then
understand the principle of self-governance within the organization. The autocracy of the
business firm has long been taken for granted.251 But democratic principles hold that members
of an organizational unit should have a say in the governance of that unit. These principles of
participation, voice, and representation support a shift from regulatory mandates to employee
governance.252
Employee governance also provides the opportunity to pursue more efficient solutions, in
an economic sense, by allowing the parties to determine the terms and conditions that best fit
their situation. Employment mandates are based in part on paternalism: the idea that the
government will mandate a better solution that the parties would reach on their own.253 Such
paternalism may be necessary to protect employees who would otherwise lack bargaining
power.254 But governance participation is designed to provide workers with more power to
negotiate their own solutions. The flexibility and specificity allowed in bargaining would allow
the parties to achieve results that are more closely tailored to their individual interests and
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utility.255 Private ordering has significant advantages when the parties are able to knowingly and
freely negotiate for an outcome that best reflects their own preferences.256
Finally, employee governance provides additional mechanisms for enforcement.
Employment mandates are vulnerable to underenforcement, which has been a chronic problem
even during Democratic administrations.257 Under the Bush Administration in the early 2000s,
agencies devolved regulatory responsibilities to employers through self-regulation programs.258
These programs allowed companies to opt out of certain regulatory requirements or inspections
in exchange for voluntary compliance programs with reporting and monitoring.259 Although
pitched as boosting enforcement while saving government funds, self-regulation was often
criticized as regulatory abnegation.260 Employee participation in governance is critical to turning
self-regulation programs into meaningful oversight with some teeth, rather than a way of
claiming compliance while cutting agency funding.261
These principles of representation, efficiency, and enforcement inform our approach to
rethinking the employment relationship. We have discussed three different types of employee
representation which may achieve these gains, in somewhat different ways: unionization, shop
floor governance, and board representation.262 We have argued that an employer should be able
to use any one of these three forms to modify regulatory mandates in ways allowed by our
approach. A fully-developed proposal would need to specify rules that employers would need to
follow for each type of governance in order to be able to opt out of regulations. The already welldeveloped rules for determining union representation provide the needed framework for that
form of representation. Shop floor and board representation need more development. This would
require answering questions like what workers have voting rights in choosing representatives?
Are those voting rights equal for full-time and part-time employees? Might employers be
allowed or required to provide for classes of employee representatives, to take account of
significant differences in the interests of different types of employees? Should there be a sunset
time imposed for opting out of some regulations, so that the body opting out would need to reaffirm that choice after a certain amount of time has passed? If so, how long should that time be?
For some particularly important and sensitive opt outs, should one require a direct employee vote
as well as approval by the representative body, and if so, for what regulations would that direct
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vote requirement apply? These are just some of the more obvious and important questions that
arise.
At the same time, we recognize that mandates may continue to play an important role
within certain contexts. Mandates may make particular sense when there are public or thirdparty interests that bargaining would not otherwise protect. A mandate for a certain benefit may
make sense if the public believes that people should have that benefit, even if they may not
otherwise want to bargain for it (like health car insurance). An employment mandate may be the
most efficient way of providing that benefit for a large group of people, based on existing
practices. Alternatively, in other cases the parties may have interests that are counter to those of
society—for example, the exclusion of racial groups from a certain firm. In these cases, society
may wish to impose mandates not to supplement or protect the interests of workers, but rather to
override their preferences in certain contexts. The choice is not simply between a mandatory rule
or allowing an employee representative body to opt out of a regulation in any way it likes. One
could allow employee representative bodies to change a regulatory provision, but impose limits
on how far they can go. For instance, a union could be allowed to agree to an hourly wage below
the statutory minimum wage, but only, say, $2 below that minimum.
A final important principle we discuss in our proposal for moving from mandate to
governance is the recognition that another key part of the design question is that some decisions
may be removed from employers altogether and moved to the government level. For instance,
health care and/or pensions may be provided by the government rather than private employers.
Or, one may have a mixed system, with provision by both the state and by private employers. In
that case, the choice of mandate versus governance within employers will depend in part upon
whether there are means for social provision of the good in question.
B. Moving from Mandates to Governance: Policy Proposals
The following proposals discuss specific areas of employment regulation that could be
reshaped under a regime of employee participation in governance. We do not discuss all areas of
employment regulation mentioned above, and for those areas we do discuss we only present a
highly skeletal outline of relevant considerations and possible approaches to how one might
allow employers with employee participation to modify the regulation that applies to them. Still,
we hope the discussion gives some sense of how our approach might work in practice.
1. Compensation and Benefits
Employee governance rights would directly impact employees’ ability to negotiate for
better compensation. The existence of a union wage premium is empirically established, as well
as intuitively plausible; the Wagner Act’s preamble specifically states that the “inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract . . . tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry.”263 The German system of
codetermination has similarly shown demonstrable effects on workers’ compensation and
263
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provides workers with a stronger presence within the firm.264 The combination of collective
bargaining and governance power will address the growing imbalance between shareholders and
workers, as evidenced by continued wage stagnation and growing corporate profits.265
What mandates could be loosened in response to this change in governance power?
Minimum wage is a significant candidate, as workers would have power to negotiate higher
compensation for themselves or to tradeoff lower compensation for other items they value.266
But society does have an interest in providing a minimum income allocated to each person—at
least some threshold amount for working. Firms may also take advantage of smaller subsets of
workers and drive down their wages, even if the workers as a whole are empowered through
governance. In a firm, for example, where 80% of the workers are professionals and 20% are
janitorial, the professional workers might join with management and shareholders to offer
subminimum wages to the janitorial employees. Society would still have an interest in
establishing a minimum wage for those workers who might have less power within firms due to
their market position or societal norms about the value of their labor.
The societal interest in providing a minimum set of resources for all could be met in at
least two ways. Most simply, one could set a floor on how low a worker representative body
could set wages. This could create new potential compromises for increasing the minimum wage.
Many consider the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 as much too low, with some cities
recently moving to increase the minimum to $15. A compromise setting the default minimum at
(say) $15 but allowing employers with employee governance to set the wage as low as (say)
$7.25 might allow movement where none is currently achievable. The minimum wage could thus
be used along the lines of a BATNA or penalty default that the parties could opt out of if they
negotiated together.267 In the alternative, government could itself provide a minimum level of
264
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resources to all citizens as part of the social compact through a uniform basic income or negative
income tax. The United States already has variations on this type of entitlement for certain
groups, such as Social Security for retirees and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) for low-income parents and children.268 But the considerable cost to the government to
provide a true universal basic income makes it hard to achieve.269
The concern about one class of workers taking advantage of another could be addressed
by establishing different classes of representatives on the worker representative body, or by
requiring a direct vote by different classes of workers in order to validate wages set below the
statutory minimum.270 Of course, such protections increase the complication in devising a new
system of regulation. But such concerns are critical to the work of devising a workplace
democracy that works as a democracy.271
Pension benefits are already treated in good part as a social good, with public provision
through Social Security. However, employers can and often do choose to provide additional
retirement benefits to their employees. The law largely leaves to employers the decision whether
to provide such benefits, and how much to provide if they do. Once the employer has promised a
pension, ERISA does fairly strictly regulate the pension plans that employers do create, largely
to ensure that the plans do deliver on their promises.272 A move from mandates to governance
could conceivably allow employers who involve employees in governance greater flexibility in
complying with ERISA, and indeed the statute does already exempt employers with unions from
certain requirements.273 One should be quite careful in multiplying such exemptions, since the
likelihood of a governmental bailout if employers default on pension obligations creates a
serious moral hazard incentive. Still, perhaps there are some requirements that could be made
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one
party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively
the contract provision they prefer.”).
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more flexible with employee representation. One candidate would be ERISA’s requirement that
plan fiduciaries focus exclusively on financial returns. With the rise of interest in sustainable
investing, the Trump Administration’s Department of Labor sharply restricted the ability of plan
fiduciaries to consider sustainability factors in making investment, even though beneficiaries
may care about some social consequences of their investments.274 Most to the point of our
analysis here, unions co-administering pensions may not want to invest in companies that engage
in employment practices harmful to their members.275 By softening the profit-maximization
principle, unions could better make tradeoffs between their obligations to current and future
members with their fiduciary responsibilities to past members.
The recent debates within the political parties over the provision of health insurance
demonstrate its importance as a workplace benefit. Here again we see a mix of public provision
and regulation of private provision. The United States does provide some governmental health
insurance, primarily through Medicare and Medicaid, but it publicly insures fewer of its citizens
than most wealthy countries.276 Many would like to change this and have the government
provide health insurance to all. As a matter of employment regulation, this makes a good deal of
sense—health insurance has a pretty weak connection to employment, and the American
connection between employment and health insurance discourages mobility in labor markets and
may make it harder for more marginal workers to get attractive jobs.277 However, the costs
would be high and the politics are difficult.278 Absent a move to universal health insurance,
would a move from mandates to governance suggest changes in the regulation of employerprovided health insurance? The Affordable Care Act requires large enough employers to
purchase health insurance for their employees, and imposes a range of requirements on what that
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insurance must cover.279 Should employers with employee governance be allowed to waive some
of those requirements? There are some arguments for that—the ACA requirements impose a
pretty high level of coverage, which may be more costly than some employees want given the
opportunity costs. Unions and internal governance mechanisms are better positioned than
individual employees to evaluate the value of complicated insurance plans, which may mitigate
the costs associated with greater flexibility about plan policies.
2. Workplace safety
Employers have both common law and statutory requirements to provide a safe
workplace.280 The OSHA regulations are detailed and onerous, and a prime target for allowing
modification by employers with employee governance. Although workers are not aware of all
relevant safety risks, they do learn a lot about hazards on the job. The collective organization that
comes with employee governance would cast a wider and tighter net for this information, pulling
it all together for deeper examination. And while many workplaces may be dangerous, most
workplace dangers are more limited to workers themselves.281 Indeed, employers with adequate
internal compliance programs already can receive less stringent enforcement supervision under
some federal and state workplace safety initiatives,282 one of the existing practices that serves as
a model for our approach to providing more regulatory flexibility to employers with good
internal practices. The keys are that: (1) workers must have authentic power—not window
dressing, and (2) agencies must still provide expertise and oversight for those dangers than
unions do not have the resources to monitor.
Employers with worker governance should be permitted to go beyond lighter supervision
practices to allowing employers to modify some substantive restrictions on workplace safety.
Although any of the three forms of employee governance should be able to invoke the ability to
modify regulations, one common suggestion is the use of work safety committees.283 We would
not grant carte blanche. Regulation should provide a hard floor of standards below which no
employer may fall.
In response to the debate over employer liability for infections during the Covid-19
pandemic, we suggested a possible proposal: employers following a Covid-19 safety plan that
had been approved by its employees and met threshold CDC requirements would have a defense
to a tort or workers compensation claim from employees who claim to have been affected at that
workplace.284
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3. Limits on discipline and termination
The common law employment at will doctrine provides little protection for employees,285
and hence little scope for using employee governance to reduce the scope of regulation. The
common law does prohibit employers from firing an employee who refused to violate the law or
professional codes of conduct in ways that injure or risk injury to third parties.286 Since those
restrictions protect third parties, employers with employee governance should not be able to
avoid them.
The extensive modern statutory prohibitions on discrimination in termination and other
employment practices287 raise rather different considerations. These prohibitions are in the first
instance about protecting employees, and hence it could be argued that employees acting
collectively should be able to limit those protections if they so choose. As a society, however, we
understand discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and so forth as categorical social evils.
Moreover, these protections are often counter-majoritarian in nature, and worker governance is
not immune to the influence of bias, discrimination, and bigotry against minority groups. While
labor organizations have often served as forces for empowerment for workers of color, they have
also served as tools of oppression.288 Unions, employee directors, or general works councils are
all highly problematic, as they are chosen by all employees collectively, not just by those who
belong to groups vulnerable to discrimination.
One possible policy respond is to incorporate governance power for organizations
representing vulnerable groups. As it happens, versions of such organizations are quite common
in contemporary large corporations, most have which have a number of employee resource or
affinity groups based on the main categories of antidiscrimination law, such as race, gender,
sexual orientation, religion, and veteran status.289 These organizations typically have no formal
authority within a firm. However, one could imagine giving them formal oversight responsibility
of some sort over alleged discriminatory practices within a firm. Because of our first concern
above, we don’t think that even effective, empowered affinity groups should be able to waive
antidiscrimination prohibitions. But perhaps where such organizations are adequately
empowered and represent enough employees of a protected category within a firm, that might
create some presumptive evidence of legal compliance by the firm that could aid it in responding
to complaints of discrimination. Our proposal would tread hesitantly here, but perhaps
antidiscrimination law could be tailored to encourage empowerment of affinity groups as it has
been used to encourage in-house antiharassment reporting and correction programs.290
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C. Boundaries of Employment
As platform companies like Uber, Lyft, and Doordash have endeavored to redefine the scope
of employment, their growth poses challenges for our employee-oriented approach. Recent
developments in California illustrate the difficulty in assuming that broad categorization will
take care of the problem. California has earned its reputation as a state with an employee-friendly
approach to labor and employment law. In the mid-20th Century, the California Supreme Court
established much more lenient approaches to implied-in-fact employment contracts,291 as well as
the use of good faith to protect employee expectations.292 Although these doctrines have been
scaled back,293 the state still has an array of unique approaches to employment regulation,
including a high minimum wage,294 mandated break times,295 paid sick leave,296 and the
provision of safety equipment.297 Critically, California had also moved to protect these
protections against employer work-arounds by broadening its definition of “employee,” first in a
state supreme court decision298 and then by statute.299 However, California voters have upended
this framework by voting decisively in favor of Proposition 22, which removes certain platform
workers from the employment category. Even with Democratic control of the state government,
the difficulties in reversing a voter proposition mean that the new system is in place for the
foreseeable future. And companies such as Uber and Lyft have designs on bringing their
recategorization of platform workers to states across the nation.300
Drivers at ride-sharing companies and other platform workers present a challenge that
goes beyond the definition of “employee”. They are part of a broader trend of disintermediation
or fissuring in many companies and industries.301 Workers are more loosely connected to the
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businesses for which they work. They are more temporary, and more interchangeable. They have
less employment security and typically receive fewer benefits. This trend is responsible for the
ongoing pressure on the definition of “employees,” but it is also discouraging for anyone who,
like us, envisions a world where workers play a central role in their workplace, and where a
person’s job is personally and professionally as well as financially fulfilling for a greater
percentage of workers. How can employment law respond to this challenge? Does our proposed
move from mandates to governance present a partial response, or is our proposal itself threatened
by the move to fissured workplaces?
The answer is some of both, as we can see by applying the employment and corporate
law arguments we surveyed in Parts I and II to platform companies. Consider first the arguments
within employment law. On the one hand, the need for regulation302 is often at least as strong for
protecting those working for companies like Uber as it is for other employees. With their weaker
ties to the company, platform workers are likely to be even more limited in access to important
information.303 They also face stronger obstacles to internal collective action,304 as they interact
with each other less on the job. The tendency to receive fewer benefits, such as pensions or
health insurance, also creates more problems for taxpayers.305
On the other hand, the costs of our current complex system of employment regulation306
are also greater for platform companies like Uber. Major elements of that employment regulation
genuinely do not fit well with the circumstances of many platform workers. For example,
required health care provision might not match up for those Uber and Lyft drivers who only
work for the companies sporadically.307 There is greater heterogeneity among many platform
workers as well. Some Uber and Lyft drivers prefer to work only part-time at hours they
determine, while others need it as a full-time job. Their preferences as to how hours and wage
regulation should apply to their jobs are likely to diverge significantly (which may be part of the
reason that the California ballot initiative succeeded).308 Thus, while the need for protection
remains strong for platform workers, the inadequacy of a one-size-fits all set of rule is severe.
The arguments for allowing firms with employee involvement to opt out of some rules,309
creating space for more nuanced regulation that better fits the needs of both firms and workers,
are thus particularly strong for businesses like Uber.
But some of the corporate governance-based arguments for encouraging employee
involvement in governance face a serious challenge from fissured workplaces. Some of the
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strongest arguments for employee governance stem from the centrality of employees to firms,
and that centrality is weakened by disintermediation. Platform workers are less tied to specific
schedules and may work for a variety of different apps in the course of a day.310 Their
disconnection from a traditional firm means that they are in fact more like free agents and less
likely to be plugged into a worker information network.311 There may also be more heterogeneity
in the interests of ride-sharing drivers,312 for whom that work plays quite different roles in their
lives. With their weakened attachment to the firm, platform workers may also take a more shortterm perspective on firm decisions. For these reasons, it is less clear that employee involvement
in governance is desirable in platform companies.
On the other hand, some of the corporate governance arguments for employee
involvement still apply at firms like Uber, perhaps even with greater strength. The weak
attachment to the company may reduce worker satisfaction and fulfillment; participating in
governance may help counteract that problem.313 Also, note that Uber, the leading example of a
platform company, has not exactly been a model of good corporate governance, and its various
scandals have hurt Uber’s stockholders and customers as well as its workers.314 Although Uber’s
drivers may not be as well-informed about the business as better-integrated employees are, their
involvement in governance, particularly if through electing board representatives, may still
provide a useful check on management that would improve corporate governance for all
stakeholders.315
Though the arguments are thus ambivalent, we think that on balance the move from
mandates to governance could help address the challenge of fissured workplaces. Should other
state or federal regulators choose to broaden the definition of employee along the lines of
California’s AB 5,316 the ability to evade some of the costs of the resulting applicable regulations
by adopting employee governance could avoid some of the problems of such a revised definition.
Rather than having a chunky off/on button as to the application of employment mandates,
governance mechanisms could allow workers to negotiate with platform companies for a more
tailored set of terms. This flexibility might have particular pull in the gig economy, where at
least some segment of workers do in fact want nontraditional work arrangements. This
compromise might stop the ongoing legal warfare over employment coverage; the companies
may have won the Prop 22 battle, but there are 49 more states and a variety of federal statutes
that could easily be read to render these workers employees. Plus, employment status would put
the companies and workers in better stead with respect to antitrust law, which might otherwise
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implicate these companies in widespread price-fixing.317 Creative solutions are needed, and
governance rights combined with negotiating flexibility hold some promise as a reasonable place
for the parties to meet.
Conclusion
The United States has responded to the increasing disempowerment and disconnectedness
of its workforce through piecemeal federal and state mandates designed to address particular
workplace or societal problems. While these legislative efforts may ameliorate harsh aspects of
the employment relationship, they do not address the underlying cause: the lack of worker power
to participate in workplace governance. Policymakers need to look beyond labor and
employment law to the internal power structure within the organization, where employees have
been shut out. A change in governance rights for workers would shift the balance of power back
toward the middle and provide the opportunity for workers to participate in difficult firm
choices.
Our proposal replies to the main concern of corporate leaders and legal scholars who are
skeptical of legal approaches like codetermination in Germany that mandate employee
involvement in governance. They argue that corporate governance should be about protecting
shareholders,318 and that employees (like other stakeholders) should be protected in other areas
of the law. But corporate law scholars pay little attention to the rigid mandates and complexities
of employment law, a style of regulation that contradicts the core values of U.S. business
association law with its emphasis on flexibility and choice. We would offer businesses a new
option, expanding who gets represented in corporate governance in exchange for more flexibility
in employment law. If that choice does not improve life for both companies and their employees,
they need not adopt it.
Employment mandates have inherent limitations that can hurt both employees and their
employers. Our system needs worker power so that firms and workers rely less on external
regulation and more on internal governance.
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